The Adoption and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation: Evidence for the U.S. Economy by Lisa M. Lynch
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE ADOPTION AND DIFFUSION OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION:








This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation Program on Innovation and
Organizational Change.  The research in this paper was conducted while the author was a Census Bureau
Associate at the Boston Research Data Center.  Research results and conclusions are those of the author
and do not necessarily indicate concurrence by the Bureau of the Census.  This paper has been screened
to ensure that no confidential data are revealed.  I would like to thank Sandra Black for her significant
collaboration on previous papers using these data.  I would also like to thank Fabio Schiantarelli, participants
in seminars at Tufts University and Columbia University, and the NBER productivity lunch seminar
group for useful comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Lisa M. Lynch. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.The Adoption and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation: Evidence for the U.S. Economy
Lisa M. Lynch




Using a unique longitudinal representative survey of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing businesses
in the United States during the 1990's, I examine the incidence and intensity of organizational innovation
and the factors associated with investments in organizational innovation.  Past profits tend to be positively
associated with organizational innovation.  Employers with a more external focus and broader networks
to learn about best practices (as proxied by exports, benchmarking, and being part of a multi-establishment
firm) are more likely to invest in organizational innovation. Investments in human capital, information
technology, R&D, and physical capital appear to be complementary with investments in organizational
innovation.  In addition, non-unionized manufacturing plants are more likely to have invested more




Medford, MA  02155
and NBER
lisa.lynch@tufts.edu  3
1.  Introduction 
 
  The sustained growth in productivity in the United States that began in the mid 
1990s continues to surprise and confound economists.  Between 1995 and 2006 
productivity for nonfarm businesses grew at 2.7 percent and productivity in 
manufacturing grew at 4 percent per year.  This increase in productivity, more than a full 
percentage point above its average annual growth rate for the period 1970-1995, has been 
labeled by some as the advent of a “New Economy.”  How long this trend will last is the 
subject of much speculation, with economists such as Janet Yellen (2005), President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2004) 
projecting that we are now on track to maintain a trend rate of productivity growth of 
around 2.5 percent per year.   
  Skeptics of the New Economy phenomenon argue that the growth in productivity 
through 2005 is simply the result of employers’ uncertainty due to rising oil prices and 
geo-political concerns.   These factors make employers push their incumbent workers 
harder since they are reluctant to hire even though profitability is high.  Therefore, once 
these concerns disappear, there should be a marked increase in hiring and a subsequent 
fall in productivity growth.  Whether you believe this is a permanent change in the 
growth rate of the productivity of the U.S. or just a temporary phenomenon has 
significant implications for monetary policy.  It is therefore very important to try to 
understand the underlying dynamics of productivity growth in order to predict its 
sustainability.    
The rise in productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s through the first 
half of this decade has been attributed in large part to investments in information and   4
communication technology.  However, a careful examination of the various studies that 
have attempted to disentangle the contributions of capital deepening, labor quality and 
total factor productivity to average labor productivity suggests that even after accounting 
for capital deepening, total factor productivity growth has been a very important 
determinant of the growth of average labor productivity.  Capital deepening contributes 
almost sixty percent of the growth in average labor productivity but total factor 
productivity contributes thirty seven percent according to Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh’s 
(2004) decomposition.  Total factor productivity is something of a black box but some of 
the usual suspects include technology, managerial practices, and measurement error.    
Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2004) further decompose TFP into IT and non-IT components 
and conclude that the non-IT components are increasingly important for productivity 
growth post 1995.  In Black and Lynch (2004, 2005) we argue that an additional critical 
component of TFP is workplace human resource management practices or organizational 
innovation.  We find that during the 1990s changes in organizational innovation may 
have accounted for as much as 30 percent of output growth in U.S. manufacturing.    
While there have been an increasing number of empirical studies that suggest a 
significant positive association between labor productivity and organizational innovation 
there has been relatively little research on why some firms decide to invest in 
organizational innovation and others do not.  To address this gap in the literature I use a 
unique representative survey of US businesses over the 1990s to examine the patterns of 
adoption of organizational innovation (both incidence and intensity) and factors 
associated with higher incidence and intensity of organizational innovation.  Past profits 
tend to be positively associated with organizational innovation.  Employers with a more   5
external focus and broader networks to learn about best practices (as proxied by exports, 
benchmarking, being part of a multi-establishment firm) are more likely to invest in 
organizational innovation.  Firm investments in human capital, information technology, 
R&D, and more generally in physical capital appear to be complementary and precede 
investments in organizational innovation.  In addition, non-unionized manufacturing 
plants are more likely to have invested more broadly and intensely in organizational 
innovation.   
  The next two sections of the paper present a working definition of organizational 
innovation and summarize the theoretical and empirical literature on the adoption and 
diffusion of workplace practices and organizational innovation.  Section 4 provides some 
background discussion on the unique data that are used for this study and section 5 
presents empirical findings on the incidence and diffusion of organizational innovation.  
Section 5 examines not only the patterns of incidence and diffusion over the 1990s but 
also the factors associated with such adoption and diffusion.  The final section of the 
paper considers the implications of the main findings of the paper for our understanding 
of future productivity growth trends. 
 
2.  A Working Definition of Organizational Innovation 
  The challenge with studying organizational innovation (or for that matter any 
other type of intangible asset) is that there is no clear definition of what organizational 
innovation is, how to measure it, or how to best quantify its contribution to output (either 
current or future). Unlike physical capital, the value of organizational capital (and its 
change) does not appear on the balance sheet of a firm, and when firms undertake   6
substantial organizational change or re-engineering this is typically treated as 
“consumption” rather than an increase in the assets of a firm.   
Since the 1990s the European Union has been conducting every 4 years the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to monitor Europe’s progress in the area of 
innovation.  In 2004 the European Statistical Agency EUROSTAT began supplementing 
its questions on product and process innovation in the CIS with questions on 
organizational innovation.  In the CIS organizational innovation is broadly defined as 
changes in firm structure or management methods that are intended to improve a firm’s 
use of knowledge, the quality of goods and services, or the efficiency of work flows.  In 
Black and Lynch (2005) we propose a more specific working definition of organizational 
innovation for U.S. firms that includes the following components – workforce training, 
employee voice, work design (including the use of cross-functional production 
processes), and shared rewards.  This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all 
dimensions of organizational innovation, rather a range of practices that have been found 
to significantly enhance the productive capacity of a firm. 
  Workforce training is most commonly undertaken to improve a firm’s use of 
knowledge, quality of goods and services and the efficiency of work flows.  As new 
technology is introduced, training demands of a firm are likely to rise.  In addition, as 
team work becomes more important workers need to acquire additional skills to help 
them function in a more interactive group environment.  How one measures training 
investments is critical for examining its impact on economic outcomes such as 
productivity.  Simple incidence measures such as yes and no answers to the question 
whether a firm conducts any formal training programs for employees are unlikely to   7
capture adequately organizational innovation.  Instead measures such as the proportion of 
workers trained, hours of training, and types of training programs offered do a better job 
of capturing the intensity of training investments by employers. 
  The ability to tap into knowledge of non-managerial workers is an important 
feature of organizational innovation.  This can be done by measuring a second component 
of organizational innovation -- “employee voice”. By this I mean those organizational 
structures that give workers, especially non-managerial workers, input into the decision-
making associated with the design of the production process and greater autonomy and 
discretion in the structure of their work. Traditional forms of work organization are very 
task-specific; each production worker has a specific task to complete, and once they learn 
how to accomplish the task, there is little independent thought involved. However, newer 
forms of organization involve giving employees, specifically non-managerial workers, 
more input into the production process and greater opportunities to improve efficiency.  
The argument that worker voice can increase productivity is consistent with the 
theoretical discussion presented in Freeman and Lazear (1995).  In empirical work 
researchers have included as measures of this dimension of organizational innovation 
items such as whether or not a workplace is unionized, whether the firm has a works 
council, the proportion of workers meeting on a regular basis to discuss workplace issues, 
the use of total quality management systems, and the proportion of workers in self-
managed teams. 
  In Black and Lynch (2005) we discuss a third component of organizational 
innovation -- work design, that includes the use of cross-functional production processes 
that result in more decentralized and flexible allocation of labor in the firm. Examples   8
include reengineering efforts that may involve changing the occupational structure of the 
workplace (including increasing the number of technical workers), the number of workers 
per supervisor, the number of levels of management within the firm, the existence and 
diffusion of job rotation, and job share arrangements. We also include in this component 
methods by which firms monitor their practices relative to others such as benchmarking. 
  Finally, while it is not a type of organizational innovation per se, shared rewards 
such as profit sharing and stock options play an important role in organizational 
innovation. These types of payments can realign workers’ interests towards those of 
shareholders. When workers are asked to come forward with ideas that would improve 
the production process but may also put their own jobs at risk, they must be given an 
incentive to do this.  This can take the form of increased pay and/or more employment (as 
opposed to job) security.  Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2001) have found strong 
evidence of complementarities between employee voice and incentive pay.  Kandel and 
Lazear (1992) argue that introducing a profit-sharing plan for all workers in a firm may 
have little or no impact on productivity unless it is linked with other workplace practices.  
So while incentive based pay in the form of shared rewards is not organizational 
innovation per se, it may act as glue that holds organizational innovation together.  
  Theoretically organizational innovation is best thought of as a continuous 
variable. However, there is no single measure that empirically will capture the full extent 
of organizational innovation within a firm.  It is not surprising, therefore, that researchers 
have used a wide array of indicators to capture organizational innovation.  Some have 
simply counted up the number of particular workplace practices while others have used 
factor analysis to construct indices of organizational innovation.  However, just adding up   9
practices may miss important synergies in organizational innovation as Milgrom and 
Roberts (1995) have argued.  Athey and Stern (1998) discuss how the existence of 
complementarity in workplace practices implies that the adoption of one practice has 
externalities for the adoption of other practices. In addition, if practices are adopted in 
clusters, then some combinations of practices may occur only infrequently making it 
difficult, empirically, to precisely estimate the impact of each practice on outcomes such 
as productivity.   
  Although there is no consensus on how to operationalize the measurement of 
organizational innovation, there are numerous studies that have established a significant 
relationship between various measures of such innovation and performance (see 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a thorough review of this literature).  Most of the studies 
using data from intra-industry studies and nationally representative surveys
1 conclude 
that the adoption of a coherent system of new human resource management practices 
such as flexible job definitions, cross-training, and work teams, along with extensive 
reliance on incentive pay, results in substantially higher levels of productivity than more 
traditional human resource management practices.  Many of these studies have also found 
evidence of the existence of synergies among workplace practices: the total impact is 
greater than the sum of the parts.   
  In spite of the large impact organizational innovation appears to have on 
productivity, we need to ask: if this is so good why isn’t everyone doing it or doing more 
of it?  Moreover, have we really captured the impact of organizational innovation on 
                                                 
1 Examples of intra-industry studies include Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1995), Arthur (1994), Kelley 
(1994 and 1996), Bailey (1993), and Dunlop and Weil (1996).  Research using nationally representative 
surveys of firms includes Black and Lynch (2001, 2004), Bartel (1994), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 
(2002), Caroli and Van Reenen (2001), Ichniowski (1990), Huselid (1995), Huselid and Becker (1996), and 
Delaney and Huselid (1996).   10
productivity or is there something we have missed about the firms that adopt 
organizational innovation that is really driving the economic outcomes we are interested 
in?   Understanding the adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation, therefore, is 
critical for our ability to predict the sustainability of productivity gains obtained through 
this type of innovation. 
 
3.  Factors Associated with Organizational Innovation 
 
  There have been very few studies that have examined the range of factors 
associated with the adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation.  Some 
exceptions include Osterman (1994) and Blasi and Kruse 2006 using nationally 
representative data on U.S. employers, and Ichniowski and Shaw (1995), Pil and 
MacDuffie (1996), Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001), and Chi, Freeman and 
Kleiner (2007) using survey data on much smaller samples of employers that were 
restricted to specific geographic locations or industrial sectors.   The only dimension of 
organizational innovation where there has been relatively more analysis of the factors 
associated with adoption and diffusion is employer provided training.  As summarized in 
Lynch (1994) and Lynch and Black (1998) investments in worker training are higher in 
larger firms and businesses that have also invested in physical capital and human capital.   
  Osterman (1994), Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) (for the steel industry) and Chi, 
Freeman and Kleiner (for a small panel of manufacturing firms close to Minneapolis) all 
found that younger businesses were more likely to adopt workplace innovations.  Younger 
firms have not had time to build up entrenched management and practices that would be 
threatened by the adoption or diffusion of organizational innovation.  In addition, Osterman 
(1994) and Chi et. al. (2007) found that small businesses and those with business   11
strategies that focused on giving employees more autonomy or who believed that they 
had a responsibility for employee welfare were more likely to introduce employee 
involvement programs, have a total quality management program or quality circles, or 
use teams.    
Institutionally unions have traditionally been the primary channel for worker 
voice.  The presence of a union in an organization that wants to undertake more 
organizational innovation can be very beneficial.  Workers in unionized businesses may 
be more willing to participate in employee involvement programs since they feel the 
union will protect their overall employment security.  However, Freeman and Rogers 
(1999) found that workers’ desire to unionize decreases if the firm they are employed in has in 
place employee involvement programs so that they feel they have some voice in the firm.  In 
addition, unions may view the introduction of alternative channels for worker voice as a 
challenge to their authority and a way to limit their power and influence.   So the 
relationship between unionization and work practices that increase employee 
involvement in decision making is not clear a priori.  Chi et. al. (2007) and Ichniowski 
and Shaw (1995) find a negative association between unionization and likelihood of 
introducing an employee involvement program whereas Osterman (1994) finds no 
impact.  Interestingly Chi et. al. (2007) find that once introduced, unionized firms are less 
likely to terminate such programs.  Most studies of the adoption of workplace innovations 
have not had data on past profitability of the business.  However, Pil and MacDuffie 
(1996) in their international study of the auto industry find some weak support for the 
hypothesis that worst performing plants are more likely to introduce workplace 
reorganization.  Nickell et. al. (2001) also find evidence for a small sample of U.K. firms 
in the 1980s that businesses are more likely to invest more in reorganization when the   12
real output price or productivity is declining.   Declining performance may be due to 
increased competition both domestically and internationally.  Osterman (1994) and Blasi 
and Kruse (2006) (using data from the same survey used in this paper) find that firms in 
industries with higher exports more likely to innovate.  However the Blasi Kruse (2006) 
analysis is done only at the industry group level and includes a limited number of other 
controls – firm size and union status. 
  Finally, some of the changes we see in work design are associated with the 
introduction and diffusion of information technologies within the firm. For example, 
email facilitates greater communication between and across workers, both managerial 
and non-managerial.  Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, (2002) and  Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and 
Hitt (2002) have argued that technical change and organizational change are 
complementary activities.   So investments in information technology and other types of 
capital may facilitate organizational innovation.   
Ideally any examination of the adoption, diffusion and termination of investments 
in organizational innovation should be done on a representative sample of businesses 
over time and control for profitability, capital investments including investments in IT, 
product market competition, management quality, unionization, and characteristics of 
workers.   Due to data limitations no previous study has done this.  This study addresses 
this gap in the literature.  Using longitudinal data from a unique nationally representative 
survey of businesses I am able to examine a wide range of factors and their association 
with the adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation.  My analysis focuses on 
five main research issues.  The first is the role of past profitability in the decision to 
undertake current or future investment in organizational innovation.  On the one hand it   13
may be the case that those businesses that have been doing poorly in the past may have a 
greater need to change and may find it is easier to get employee buy-in to dramatically 
reorganize work in a time of crisis.  On the other hand, organizational innovation is a 
costly investment so the firms most likely to adopt and invest extensively in 
organizational innovation are those who can afford to do so.  
The second issue I examine is the role of external focus and networks in the 
adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation.  It may well be the case that those 
businesses that export a higher fraction of their output, use benchmarking and are part of 
a multi-establishment firm are more likely to invest in organizational innovation.   
The third issue is the complementarity between investments in information 
technology and organizational innovation.  While it has been hypothesized that such a 
complementarity exists, having information on past as well as current investments in IT 
and organizational innovation is critical to examine sequencing of investment.   
Fourth, those businesses with greater internal capacity to take advantage of 
organizational innovation (i.e. more educated employees and more employees with 
“softer” skills such as communication) are more to adopt and have higher diffusion of 
organizational innovation than employers with less skilled workforces.   
Finally, there will be forces that will either resist or be in favor of organizational 
change.  I investigate whether older businesses, since they are more likely to have 
entrenched management, are less likely to introduce such changes. The effect of a union 
is ambiguous. On the one hand some unions may oppose organizational change because it 
is perceived as leading to a loss of union power. On the other hand, the presence of a 
union may lead workers to more willingly participate in new work practices because they   14
feel that their employment is more secure.  Moreover, managers in non-unionized plants 
may favor adopting these practices as a way to reduce the probability of a plant becoming 
unionized. Finally, certain occupational groups may be relatively more in favor of such 
investment – technical workers, while others may be more opposed because it challenges 




  The data used in this paper come from the Educational Quality of the Workforce 
National Employers Survey, EQW-NES.  The first round of the EQW-NES was 
administered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as a telephone survey in August and 
September 1994 to a nationally representative sample of more than 3,000 private 
establishments with more than 20 employees
2.  The respondents were asked to provide 
data for the previous year.  The survey represents a unique source of information on how 
employers recruit workers, organize work, invest in physical capital, and utilize education 
and training investments.  The survey over-sampled establishments in the manufacturing 
sector and establishments with more than 100 employees. Public sector employees, not-
for-profit institutions, and corporate headquarters were excluded from the sample. The 
target respondent in the manufacturing sector was the plant manager and in the non-
manufacturing sector was the local business site manager. However, the survey was 
designed to allow for multiple respondents so that information could be obtained from 
establishments that kept financial information such as the book value of capital or the 
                                                 
2 The first survey was designed by Lisa Lynch in collaboration with EQW Co-Directors 
Robert Zemsky and Peter Cappelli. The second survey included a subset of questions identical to this first 
round plus an extensive section on employers’ school-to-work activities. The surveys were supported by 
the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, US Department of Education. 
   15
cost of goods and materials used in production at a separate finance office (typically at 
corporate headquarters for multi-establishment enterprises). The sample frame for the 
survey was the Bureau of the Census SSEL file, one of the most comprehensive and up-
to-date listings of establishments in the United States. Although the sampling frame omits 
establishments with less than 20 employees, it captures establishments that employ 
approximately three-quarters of all workers in the U.S.  
The response rate in the first round EQW National Employers Survey for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing establishments was 72 percent. This is 
substantially higher than most other voluntary establishment surveys. However, not all of 
the establishments who participated in the survey completed all parts of the survey by the 
interview cutoff date of October 1, 1994. Therefore, the final number of establishments in 
the sample for which all parts of the survey were completed was 3167, a slightly lower 63 
percent 'completed' survey response rate. 
A second survey was administered by the Census Bureau in August 1997 with a 
response rate of 78 percent
3. The final sample for the second round of the EQW-NES 
included 3081 establishments -- 1827 in the manufacturing and 1254 in the non-
manufacturing sector. The second survey was considerably longer in duration than the 
first survey (close to 45 minutes). Therefore, in spite of the high overall response rate 
there are a large number of businesses that do not provide information on all questions 
asked including items such as the value of shipments and sales, the book value of the 
capital stock, the costs of materials, wages paid to workers and the proportion of workers 
trained.  This will reduce the final sample sizes used for analysis in this paper. 
                                                 
3 There was oversampling of establishments in California, Kentucky, Michigan, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania and a sub sample of establishments that had been contacted in the first round.   16
A panel of 766 establishments (approximately two-thirds of which were 
manufacturing establishments) can be constructed from the two rounds of the EQW-NES.  
The panel response rate (for first round establishments who were contacted and 
completed the interview in the second round) was 74 percent. The EWQ-NES was 
designed so that a large fraction of the manufacturing establishments could be matched 
with the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database, the LRD, which pools 
information from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Census of Manufacturers.  
In this paper I will use data on sales, capital expenditures, employment, and material and 
labor costs to construct measures of operating profits per worker and investment per 
worker.   
 
5. Empirical  Results 
 
  Using the unique data described above this section presents detailed findings on 
the incidence and extent of organizational innovation and the factors associated with the 
adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation during the 1990s.  The empirical 
work is organized as follows. Descriptive statistics on the incidence and intensity of 
organizational innovation for manufacturing and non-manufacturing businesses are 
presented first.  A cross section and longitudinal analysis of the factors associated with 
organizational innovation in the manufacturing sector follows.  Finally, I conclude with 
the empirical analysis of the factors associated with organizational innovation for the 
non-manufacturing sector. 
 Description of Practices.  Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the 
incidence and intensity of various dimensions of organizational innovation.  While the 
EQW-NES survey has information on a lengthy list of workplace practices, I focus on   17
those that have been the most significant in previous work on determinants of 
productivity and wages (see Black and Lynch (1996, 2001, 2004)).  These include the 
proportion of production workers receiving training, the proportion of non-managerial 
workers meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues, the fraction of workers in self-
managed teams, and the proportion of workers who participate in job rotation.  For each 
of these practices I also construct an incidence measure that equals 1 if any fraction of the 
workforce participates in the practice and zero otherwise.  In addition, the 1997 survey 
included a question on whether or not the establishment underwent any re-engineering 
over the past three years.  Re-engineering production is a radical change in the 
organizational structure of a company and usually means moving away from highly 
specialized and compartmentalized departments to more cross-functional teams that 
follow a product through from development to final distribution.  Since this is such a 
major disruption to the production process it is not surprising that the survey finds only a 
relatively small fraction underwent this massive organizational change – 12 percent of 
manufacturing establishments and 9 percent of non-manufacturing establishments over 
the period 1994-1997.   
  The two practices with the highest incidence include production worker training 
and the percentage of non-managerial workers meeting on a regular basis to discuss 
workplace issues. Over 80 percent of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
establishments provided training for production workers in 1994 and more than three-
quarters of all businesses reported having some non-managerial workers meeting 
regularly to discuss workplace issues.  However, less than one half of all employers use 
job rotation and slightly less than one third of employers report having self-managed   18
teams.  Manufacturing establishments report a higher incidence of usage of job rotation 
while non-manufacturing establishments report a higher incidence of employer provided 
training for non-managerial workers.  Interestingly there has not been an across the board 
increase in the incidence of the practices associated with organizational innovation over 
the period of 1994 to 1997.  In fact, in several of the dimensions of organizational 
innovation examined in this survey we see the incidence actually declining by 1997.  This 
suggests that there is experimentation in practices going on and some firms reducing or 
even terminating programs such as allowing employees to work in self-managed teams. 
  The effect of organizational innovation on the productive capacity of a firm will 
depend not only upon the incidence but also upon the extent of investments in such 
innovation.  In Table 1 we see that while almost half of all manufacturing establishments 
report having job rotation on average, only 23.7 percent of workers rotated their jobs.  
Approximately 30 percent of all establishments report having some workers in self-
managed teams yet the extent of workers in self-managed teams is much lower.  Over the 
period 1994-1997 the fraction of workers in manufacturing receiving training remained 
relatively constant around one half,  while the fraction rose in non-manufacturing from 
slightly less than half of all workers to two thirds of all workers.   While the percentage 
of employers with workers meeting on a regular basis to discuss workplace issues 
declined over this time period, the percentage of workers meeting regularly increased.   
So the decline (from a high level) of the incidence of this practice across employers is 
paralleled by more extensive employee participation within those firms who did have 
regular meetings with workers.    19
One of the reasons for the high response rate to this survey was a keen interest by 
the respondents (plant and business site managers) to find out what worked and what 
others were doing in this area of innovation.  This suggests that there may have been 
experimentation with different practices.  Table 2 shows the percentage of business that 
changed their investments in organizational innovation (+/-5 percent or more from their 
1994 level) over the period 1994-1997.  There was a great deal of change in the fraction 
of workers trained and the fraction of workers meeting regularly.  In general the trend 
was to increase this practice but there were firms that reduced their activities in these 
areas.  In addition, the extent of job rotation and workers in self-managed teams seems to 
have stalled at relatively low levels, especially in non-manufacturing.  In Black and 
Lynch (2004) we found that those manufacturing employers with a higher fraction of 
their production workers in self-managed teams had lower productivity, everything else 
constant.  So the fact that we do not see more diffusion of this practice likely reflects 
managerial experience of lower productivity gains associated with this practice compared 
to others. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of practices in 1997 across our survey for the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.  More manufacturing establishments (70 
percent) had three or more practices than non-manufacturing businesses (65 percent).  
After controlling for the intensity of usage of the practice (only counting a practice if the 
percentage of workers engaged in it is above the mean for that practice) we see in the 
bottom half of this figure that only forty percent of manufacturing and thirty-eight 
percent of non-manufacturing businesses have intensely invested in these practices.  So 
while this figure indicates that a high fraction of employers report that they are   20
innovating on these dimensions, there is still room for more intensive adoption of these 
practices within firms. 
Organizational Innovation in Manufacturing:  Cross Section Results.  I have 
separated the sample into manufacturing and non-manufacturing because for the 
manufacturing sector I am able to match the survey information on organizational 
innovation with data from the Census Bureau’s longitudinal research database, the LRD.  
Table 3 presents results from probit models of the factors associated with the probability 
of having each specific dimension of organizational innovation.  The dependent variables 
have a value of 0 or 1 simply indicating whether or not establishment has invested at all 
in the specific practice at two different points in time – 1994 and 1997.  I estimate a 
separate equation for each survey year.   
The explanatory variables are grouped into five categories – external focus 
variables, technology, profitability, skill capacity and other establishment characteristics.  
For measures of external focus I include whether or not the establishment is part of a 
multi-establishment firm, the percentage of the main product that is exported
4, and 
whether or not the establishment benchmarks its practices to other organizations.  To 
capture IT technology I include the percentage of non-managerial workers who use 
computers in their job.  Since I am able to match many of the manufacturing businesses 
in the EQW survey with the Census Bureau’s LRD I can construct the average annual 
investment per worker and the average annual operating profit per worker over the six 
years prior to the reference year for the measure of organizational innovation (see the 
appendix for more details on both of these variables).  This allows me to examine how 
past profits and investments correlate with present investments in organizational 
                                                 
4 Missing data on exports in the EQW-NES survey is supplemented with data from the Census LRD.   21
innovation.  By using average values on investment and profitability I smooth year to 
year fluctuations.  Moreover, using six years allows me to maximize the number of 
Economic Censuses (conducted every five years) used in the construction of the 
variables.  For 1994, I am also able to include whether or not the business had any R&D 
activities either at its own site or at another establishment within the firm.   
Using information from the EQW survey I construct two measures of skills 
capacity of the establishment.  The first is the average education of workers in the 
establishment using information on average education in the establishment for 5 
occupational categories and the employment share for each of these occupations within 
the establishment as weights.   The second measure is a 0-1 indicator of whether or not 
communication skills are a high priority in recruitment by the employer.  Other 
establishment characteristics controlled for include whether or not the establishment is 
unionized, the age of the establishment, the total number of workers, the share of workers 
by occupational category, the fraction of employees who are female or minority, and 
industry controls.  Unfortunately questions on age of the establishment and R&D activity 
were only asked in the 1994 survey so I am not able to include these measures in the 
1997 equation.  
In general we see in Table 3 that firms that have a more “external” focus are more 
likely to have adopted some types of organizational innovation.  However, the magnitude 
of the association between these external factors and the different dimensions of 
organizational innovation is not uniform.  Being part of a multi-establishment firm is 
positively associated with adopting several dimensions of organizational innovation 
while the share of production exported is actually associated with a lower probability of   22
training production workers.  In addition, those businesses that have a larger fraction of 
their non-managerial workers using computers in their job or invest in R&D are more 
likely to train, have workers meeting on a regular basis to discuss workplace issues, or 
have some workers organized in self-managed teams.  Lagged capital investments per 
worker (that include IT and non-IT related capital) are positively associated with having 
workers meeting regularly but negatively associated with having job rotation in 1997. 
We see little association between profits and most dimensions of innovation in 
Table 3.  The one exception is the positive association between past profits and having 
workers meet regularly to discuss workplace issues.  In terms of skill capacity, those 
establishments with more educated employees and employees with more effective 
communication skills are also more likely to have adopted various dimensions of 
organizational innovation.   
The impact of unions on organizational innovation is mixed.  On some 
dimensions such as shared rewards and training, the presence of a union increases the 
probability of there being this type of workplace innovation.  However, non-unionized 
firms are more likely to have job rotation and non-managerial workers meeting regularly.  
This is in spite of the fact that in Black and Lynch (2004) we found that unionized 
establishments that have workers meeting on a regular basis have significantly higher 
productivity than otherwise similar non-unionized establishments.    
Finally, larger employers and those establishments with a higher fraction of 
production workers are more likely to adopt these practices than smaller employers.  
Interestingly, age of the establishment does not seem to be a factor in adoption of 
organizational innovation after controlling for other characteristics of the establishment.   23
Table 4 examines a different margin of organizational innovation – the diffusion 
of specific practices within an establishment
5.  Those employers that benchmark their 
processes with other firms are more likely to have a higher fraction of their workers 
engaged in job rotation, in training, meeting regularly to discuss workplace issues and in 
self-managed teams.  In addition, businesses that have been more profitable in the past or 
that have a higher fraction of their workers using computers in their jobs are likely to 
have a higher fraction of their workforce meeting regularly or in self-managed teams.  
Engaging in R&D and having a more skilled workforce is also positively associated with 
intensive use of most of the dimensions of organizational innovation.  However, older 
and unionized establishments are likely to have a lower diffusion rate of these workplace 
practices.  Finally, the association between lagged capital investment per worker and 
organizational innovation seems to vary by practice and over time.   
The previous two tables have examined each of the dimensions of organizational 
innovation separately.  In Table 5 I allow for complementarities and synergies in these 
practices and examine first the factors associated with undertaking a significantly large 
organizational innovation -- re-engineering and then factors associated with different 
summary measures of the extent of practices within manufacturing establishments.  
Column one presents estimates from a probit analysis of the probability of a business re-
engineering their production process over the period 1994-1997 as a function of 1997 
characteristics of the establishment.  Benchmarking is associated with an increase in the 
probability of re-engineering, as does being a large firm that is part of a multi-
establishment firm.  There appears to be complementarity between investments in IT and 
re-engineering a business.  In addition, businesses that have done better in the past with 
                                                 
5 Tobit estimates with cutoffs at 0 and 100.   24
respect to profits are more likely to re-engineer.  This suggests that deep pockets rather 
than crisis times are most relevant for undertaking this type of major organizational 
innovation.   
The remaining columns examine various summary measures of the other 
dimensions of organizational innovation.  I first construct a raw count measure that just 
adds up each of the practices irrespective of how intensely a business has implemented 
the specific practice.  I then re-define count to only include a practice if the fraction of 
workers engaged in the practice is equal to or greater than the mean for manufacturing.  
This variable is labeled “count intense” and equations using these two types of measures 
are estimated using ordered probit models.  The final dependent variable is constructed 
by using principal components analysis to create an index of organizational innovation.  
Estimation for this dependent variable is done using standard multiple regression 
analysis.   
Regardless of survey year, those establishments that benchmark, have been more 
profitable in the past, have prioritized recruiting workers with high communication skills, 
have a higher fraction of production and technical workers, or are non-union are much 
more likely to have adopted a more comprehensive range of practices associated with 
organizational innovation.  In addition, in 1997 we see that those employers who have 
invested more in IT and have a more educated workforce are more likely to have invested 
more broadly in organizational innovation. 
In sum, in the cross section analysis it appears that there is some evidence of 
complementarity in investments in IT and investments in organizational innovation.  In 
addition, non-union businesses that have more educated employees, a greater share of   25
production workers, and an external focus are more likely to invest extensively and 
intensively in organizational innovation.  Finally, investments in this type of innovation 
seem to occur more in businesses that have been doing well in terms of profits rather than 
in businesses in financial crisis. 
Organizational Innovation in Manufacturing:  Panel Results.  In spite of the 
wealth of information contained in the EQW-NES survey and the Census data, this 
analysis may not control for all factors that are associated with organizational innovation.  
The cross section estimates may still be subject to omitted variable bias due to 
unobserved establishment characteristics.  One can remove biases due to omitted but 
time-invariant establishment-specific effects using panel data.  Table 6 presents fixed 
effect estimates for changes in the extent of organizational innovation.  Two measures for 
the dependent variable are used – changes in the raw count in practices between 1994 and 
1997 and re-engineering (this is a change measure since it equals 1 if the establishment 
re-engineered at any time during 1994-1997)
6.     The first column of results presents 
estimates from a standard fixed effect model.  The second column treats the change in 
investment in organizational innovation over the period 1994-1997 as a function of 
changes in establishment characteristics over this period along with the level of those 
characteristics in 1994.  The introduction of lagged level variables in this first differenced 
equation is consistent with assuming that the level of practices in 1997 depends both 
upon the level of an explanatory variable in 1997 and its cumulated value up to 1994.   
In equation 1 for both dependent variables we see that those businesses that grew 
in employment over this period were also more likely to change their investment in 
                                                 
6 This is perhaps a better specification for re-engineering than what was presented in Table 5 column 1 
where the explanatory variables are in levels.   26
organizational innovation.  This is potentially an important result since much of the 
discussion on organizational innovation seems to suggest that this type of change in 
workplace practices results in a decreased demand for labor.   
In Table 6 the coefficient of the change in lagged average profitability is not 
significant in any equation. It may be that changes in employment are picking up the 
relative economic health of these establishments or there is actually not enough variation 
in this average value over this time to pin down its coefficient.  Alternatively, 
profitability in the cross sectional equation may have simply been a proxy for the overall 
quality of a firm and of its management.  Note that while the coefficient on the change in 
profits is not significant, the lagged level of average profits in 1994 has a negative and 
significant coefficient in the equation for the change in the count measure between 1994 
and 1997, but not in the one for reengineering.  Conditional on recent past profitability, 
lower accumulated profits in the more distant past seem to be associated with 
organizational innovation further down the road. 
 Those employers that change their recruitment priorities and hire workers with 
higher communication skills are also more likely to increase their investment in 
organizational innovation.  In equation 2 we control for the cumulated stock of 
investments in organizational capital by also including the level of the explanatory 
variables in 1994.  Now a richer and more complex story emerges about investments in 
organizational innovation.  There appears to be a complementarity between the amount of 
organizational innovation and investments in IT.  Both the level and the change of the 
percentage of non-managers using computers are positive and significant in equation 2.     27
  When we examine equations 3 and 4 in Table 6 we see some differences in the 
factors associated with changes in the count of practices versus re-engineering.  For re-
engineering, which is perhaps the most extensive and expensive form of organizational 
innovation, having in place a more educated workforce or being part of a multi-
establishment firm resulted in an increased likelihood that the plant re-engineered its 
production process.  Although the fraction of non-managers using computers is never 
significant, the coefficient on the change in the lagged average investment per worker is 
positive and significant for re-engineering in equation 4 suggesting complementarities 
between past investment in all types of physical capital and more recent investments in 
organizational innovation.  Those establishments who were more inward focused in 1994 
or had invested in softer skills in their workforce were also more likely to adopt 
additional dimensions of organizational innovation over the period 1994-1997.     
In sum, looking at the results for the cross section and panel equations together 
we see some evidence, especially in the cross section equations, that those businesses 
who have had higher past profits are better positioned to undertake investments in 
organizational innovation.  Past profits tend to be positively associated with 
organizational innovation.  Employers with a more external focus and broader networks 
to learn about best practices (as proxied by exports, benchmarking, being part of a multi-
establishment firm, and having a more diverse workforce) are more likely to invest in 
organizational innovation.  The positive association seen in the cross section results 
between investing in R&D and investing in organizational capital may reflect a broader 
taste for innovation by management.  Investments in human capital, information 
technology and more generally in physical capital appear to be complementary and   28
precede investments in organizational innovation.  Plants that have more employees and a 
higher share of production and technical workers are more likely to adopt and invest 
more intensively.  Finally, non-unionized plants are more likely to have invested more 
broadly and intensely in most dimensions of organizational innovation.   
  Due to confidentiality restrictions, I have not been able to report industry 
coefficients in each of the equations presented.  Nevertheless, there are clear patterns 
which emerge across sub-sectors within manufacturing.  Primary and fabricated metals 
along with establishments in food and tobacco are much more likely to adopt and invest 
more intensively in the various dimensions of organizational innovation examined here.  
However, the one industry that consistently has a significantly lower probability of 
investing is textile and apparel.  This final result is perhaps not that surprising given the 
looming elimination of the Multi-Fiber Agreement facing this industry at the time of 
these surveys.   These results suggest that there are important industry differences in the 
adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation that would be important to consider 
in prioritizing sectors for intra-industry research.   
  Organizational Innovation in the Non-Manufacturing Sector.  Tables 7-9 re-
examine the factors associated with organizational innovation but now focusing on the 
non-manufacturing sector.  There are clearly important differences between these two 
broad sectors such as average size of establishment.  However, one of the most important 
differences between these sectors in the EQW-NES surveys has to do with the diffusion 
of information technology.  One in three non-managerial workers in the manufacturing 
sector uses computers in their jobs while, as shown in Table 7, two-thirds of non-
managerial workers in non-manufacturing in 1997 use computers in their job.    29
Unfortunately it is not possible to match the EQW-NES survey for non-manufacturing 
establishments with establishment level data from the Census Bureau such as lagged 
operating profits since these data are not collected at this level of disaggregation by the 
Census Bureau
7.  Nevertheless we can see how other factors are associated with adoption 
and diffusion of organizational capital in non-manufacturing establishments.  In 
particular, it will be interesting to see if we see the same associations between 
investments in human capital and information technology with investments in 
organizational capital.   
  Table 7 presents findings on the probability of adopting various components of 
organizational innovation.  As in the results for manufacturing we see that using 
benchmarks, having a more educated workforce and investing in R&D is associated with 
an increase in the probability of adopting several dimensions of organizational 
innovation.  However investments in IT seem to only be positively and significantly 
associated with training and not any other component.  The coefficient for unionization is 
insignificant with the exception of the probability of having shared rewards in 1994 
where it appears with a positive sign.  Larger establishments (in terms of employment) 
are more likely in some years to have shared rewards for non-managerial workers or to 
have job rotation. 
  Table 8 contains the results on the diffusion of various dimensions of 
organizational innovation.  We see that investing in R&D is associated with a higher 
proportion of workers getting training, a higher fraction of non-managerial workers 
meeting to discuss workplace issues, and a higher fraction of employees working in self-
                                                 
7 I also do not include fraction of product exported due to missing data for 1997 that can not be filled in 
with Census data.  However, for 1994 this is never significant for any equations estimated.   30
managed teams.  Unionized establishments have a higher fraction of non-managerial 
workers receiving training but a lower fraction of workers meeting regularly.  For the 
first time we see the age of establishment coming in significant with younger 
establishments, as well as smaller establishments, more likely to have a higher diffusion 
of organizational innovation. In addition we see a positive association between the 
diffusion of information technology and the fraction of workers meeting to discuss 
workplace issues in 1994. 
  In Table 9 I allow for complementarities and synergies in these practices and 
examine the factors associated with undertaking re-engineering and the number of 
practices adopted in non-manufacturing establishments.  Column one presents probit 
estimates of the probability of a business re-engineering their production process over the 
period 1994-1997 as a function of 1997 characteristics of the establishment.  
Benchmarking, being part of a multi-establishment firm and having a more educated 
workforce are all positively associated with undertaking this major organizational 
innovation.   
  The remaining columns in Table 9 present results on the degree of investment in 
organizational innovation by counting the number of practices, only counting practices 
when they pass a threshold of diffusion, or using an index of organizational innovation as 
the dependent variable.  In general we see that establishments with a more external focus 
as proxied by benchmarking or being part of a multi-establishment firm are more likely to 
have undertaken multiple dimensions of organizational innovation.  Those establishments 
with more educated workers and who have invested more in IT are also more likely to   31
have invested in multiple components of organizational innovation.  Unionization is 
never significant nor is size of establishment except in 1994 for the index of practices. 
  Finally, while I can not report specific coefficients I can summarize the 
relationships between sub sectors in non-manufacturing and different dimensions of 
organizational innovation.  In general the sub sector that is more likely to invest in 
various dimensions of organizational innovation even after controlling for a broad range 
of other factors is the wholesale trade sector.  Not surprisingly, the likelihood of workers 
working in self-managed teams is greater in the construction industry and less in financial 
services.  Workers in the communications and utilities sectors are more likely to be in job 
rotation and those in business services are more likely to receive employer provided 
training.  These results highlight the importance of including a wider range of controls 
when trying to examine the relationship between industry and organizational innovation.  





The latest measures of productivity growth for 2006 suggest a slowdown in 
growth from the previous decade.  Does this mean that the so-called “New Economy” has 
returned to the “Same-Old Economy”?  The answer will depend in large part on the 
investments companies will make in innovation – both technological and organizational.  
This paper has provided evidence to suggest that at least in terms of investments in 
organizational innovation there are several factors that seem to be highly correlated with 
this type of innovation.  These include having a skilled workforce, higher past operating   32
profits, significant past investments in information technology, an external focus on the 
part of management, and being a relatively young and non-unionized business.   
With an increasingly global economy it is likely that U.S. managers are going to 
continue to be more outwardly focused.  Profit rates are at historical highs so businesses 
certainly have the financial resources to invest in organizational innovation.  However, 
since the later part of 2006 business investment in equipment and software has slowed 
sharply.  This may have negative consequences on productivity growth directly and 
indirectly due to the complementarity between IT and organizational innovation.  
Unionization in the private sector in the U.S. continues to decline so we might expect to 
see more investment by non-unionized employers in organizational innovation.  
However, as discussed in Black and Lynch 2004 and 2001, those unionized 
establishments that also invest in organizational innovation have significantly higher 
productivity than similar non-unionized establishments.  Therefore, the impact of this 
decline in unionization on productivity may be mixed.   
An important factor that facilitates investments in organizational innovation is the 
skill level of our workforce.  This is a potential area of concern.  From the OECD 
International Adult Literacy Survey we know that only half of the U.S. adult population 
aged 16-65 years of age has the minimum proficiency necessary, as identified by the 
National Institute for Literacy, to succeed in the labor market.  From one in five to as 
many as one in four U.S. adults scored in the lowest category for the three literacy areas 
that were tested -- prose, document, and quantitative literacy.  Given this skills gap, firms 
that would like to invest in organizational innovation may find themselves constrained by 
skills shortages in our economy.   33
The final factor associated with more organizational innovation is the age of 
establishment, in particular for the non-manufacturing sector.  The bad news here is that 
we do not know much about these firms.  Our business statistics have not kept up with 
the changing nature of our economy
8.  Not only do they not track important forms of 
intangible capital such as organizational innovation that have played an increasingly 
important role in productivity growth in recent years, they also provide limited coverage 
of new young businesses.  Census data limitations also mean that we are not able to 
examine the relationship between past profits and innovation in the non-manufacturing 
sector as we are able to do for manufacturing.  Addressing these data limitations would 
be enormously helpful to researchers and policy makers alike so that they may better 
understand the role of all types of innovation for the U.S. economy. 
                                                 
8 See Haltiwanger, Lynch and Mackie (2007) for more discussion on these data gaps.   34
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Data Appendix 
 
Shared rewards:  Does your establishment contribute towards stock options or profit 
sharing? 
 
Job Rotation:  Job rotation refers to a work design system that allows employees to rotate 
between different jobs.  What percent of, or how many non-managerial and non-
supervisory employees are currently involved in job rotation? 
 
Production worker formal training:  Formal training includes all types of training 
activities that have a predefined objective as opposed to informal on-the-job training.  
Examples of structured or formal training include seminars, lectures, workshops, 
audiovisual presentations, apprenticeship, and structured on-the-job learning.  What 
percent of, or how many, production workers received formal training last year? 
 
Workers meeting regularly:  What percent of, or how many, non-managerial and non-
supervisory employees are involved in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss workplace 
issues? 
 
Self-managed teams:  Self managed teams have some degree of responsibility and 
discretion over such decisions as methods of work, tasks schedules, assignment of 
members to different tasks, and feedback about group performance.  What percent of, or 
how many, non-managerial and non-supervisory employees are currently involved in 
self-managed teams? 
 
Reengineering:  Did this establishment undergo any re-engineering over the past three 
years? 
 
For Manufacturing Establishments Only: 
 
Using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database  – average annual 
operating profit between 1987-1992 or 1990-1995; average annual investment per worker 
1987-1992 or 1990-1995.  Operating profit is calculated as total revenue – (labor + 
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Incidence (% of establishments that have this): 
Production Worker Training 
Production Workers meeting regularly 
Workers in self-managed teams 
Job Rotation 
Reengineering since 1994  
 
Extent (% of workers): 
Production Worker Training 
Production Workers meeting regularly 






1994                1997 
 
 87.6                 76.6 
 76.8                 74.2 
 32.6                 31.7 
 44.6                 49.6 
   -                    12.3 
 
 
52.3                  51.8 
40.2                  52.8 
11.9                  16.7 





1994                  1997 
 
 80.9                   85.8 
 81.9                   72.6 
 32.7                   28.0 
 48.0                   39.8 
    -                      9.0 
 
 
 47.8                   66.6 
 56.9                   57.3 
 13.4                   13.2 





Table 2:  Percentage of businesses that increased, decreased or left unchanged 




Extent (% of workers): 
 
Production Worker Training 
 
Production Workers meeting regularly 
 







 up     down    unchanged 
 
42%      35%        22% 
 
37         27           36      
 
26         16           58 
 
33         25           43  
Non-Manufacturing 
 
 up      down    unchanged 
 
61%        21%      17% 
 
41           22          37 
 
19           19          62 
 
26           15          59 
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Figure 1:  Extent and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation (1997 Weighted Data) 
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Table 3:  Probability of Having a Specific Innovation: Manufacturing*  
Dependent Variable:         Means              Incentive pay      rotate            training        meeting  self-managed  
Independent Variables       1994    1997   1994     1997  1994  1997  1994  1997   1994  1997  1994  1997   
 
External Focus 
Multi-establishment    .78  .78   .27*    .38**  -.17     .04  -.05  .06  .42*  -.07  .08  .21* 
              (.14)    (.12)    (.14)   (.12)  (.23)      (.16)  (.20)  (.15)  (.14)  (.12) 
%  of  product  exported      8  8  .01* -.004  .004 .003 -.02*  -.007  .02* .007 .01* .002 
            (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.01)  (.005) (.004) (.003) 
Benchmark      .44 .42 .18   .14  .25 .42 .22 .25*  .15 .34**  .04 .27** 
            (.12)    (.09) (.12) (.09) (.21) (.14) (.20) (.13) (.12) (.09) 
 
Technology 
%  Non-managers  use  computers  32  34    -.001  .004 .002 .002 -.001  .006*  .0002  .007**  .001 .007** 
          (.002)  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
average investment per worker*   -  -  .0005   -.002  .006  -.005*  -.02  .01  .02  .02*  .006  -.004 
      (.002)  (.003)    (.005)  (.003)  (.01)  (.01)  (.02)  (.01)  (.005)  (.003) 
Do R&D      .73  -    .47**     -  .23*      -  .57*      -  .17      -  .28*      - 
      (.14)   (.13)   (.23)   (.20)   (.14) 
 
Profitability 
Avg. operating profit per worker*   -  -   .50  .14 .29 -.29  .74 -.51  1.27*  .14 -.37  .45 
            (.35)    (.30) (.36) (.31) (.52) (.47) (.59) (.44) (.35) (.30) 
 
Skill Capacity 
Average  years  of  education  12.6 12.5 .11    .14* -.15 .15* -.22 .30**  .09  .19* .11  .21** 
            (.10)    (.07) (.10) (.076)  (.16) (.10) (.17) (.10) (.10) (.076) 
Communication  skills    .72 .57   .19  .21*  -.20  .21*  .21 .15 .26 .30*  .22*  .25* 
            (.13)    (.09) (.13) (.09) (.21) (.13) (.19) (.12) (.12) (.09) 
 
Other Characteristics 
Age         35.6  -   -.002     -  -.003      -  .002      -  .005      -  -.002      - 
      (.002)   (.002)   (.004)   (.004)   (.002)   
Unionized      .42 .38 .25*    -.19*  -.18  -.25**  -.06  .30*  -.54**  .05 -.09  -.08 
            (.12) (.10)    (.12) (.10) (.22) (.15) (.20) (.14) (.12) (.10)   41
Total workers       775  571   .0001*  .00014*.0002**-9.9e-06   .0003*     .001**   .0006*  .00002  .0002**.00003 
        (5e-05)  (7e-07)  (7e-05)  (6e-05)  (.00017)(.0002)        (.0002)(.0001)  (.00007)(.00006) 
%  production  workers   65.6 68.4   .006  .003 .01~ .01* .02* .02* .009 .02**  .009 .014* 
      (.006)    (.005)  (.006)  (.005)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.006)  (.006) 
%  managers     9.1 9.4 .003    -.003  -.001  -.0003  .02 .004  -.01  .01 .002  .008 
      (.01)    (.01)      (.011)  (.008)  (.02)  (.01)  (.02)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01) 
%  supervisors      7.8 6.1 -.002    .005  .007  .027*  .02 .01 .004  .01 -.003  .02~ 
      (.01)    (.01)  (.01)  (.012)  (.02)  (.02)  (.03)  (.02)  (.014)  (.012) 
%  technical  workers    7.7 6.6 .006    .004  .02*  .001  .03 .01 .01 .02*  .02*  .02* 
            (.01)    (.009)    (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
 
Number  of  Establishments    589 926 589    926 589 926 589 926 589 926 589 926 
  
Pseudo  R-squared    .11  .06  .11 .09 .23 .16 .23 .13 .08 .09 
 
*Average investment per worker and average operating profit are for the period 1987-1992 for 1994 equations and for the period 1990-1995 for the 1997 
equations.  Also included in the estimation:  2-digit industry controls, %employees female, % employees minority, and the omitted occupational category is sales 
and clerical workers.  Standard errors in (), * significant at 10%, ** significant at 1%, ~ almost significant at 10% 
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Table 4:  Diffusion of Specific Innovations: Manufacturing*  
Dependent Variable:                   %rotate   %  trained   %  meeting   %self-managed  
Independent Variables       1994  1997      1994  1997    1994   1997      1994    1997  _   
External Focus 
Multi-establishment     .57  -2.00   2.10  4.52   4.81  -1.39   1.02  .94 
      (3.06)  (2.70)   (3.89)  (3.41)   (4.07) (3.60)   (2.81) (2.74) 
%  of  product  exported      .05  .10   .005  -.06   .04  -.06   .15  -.03 
      (.09)  (.07)   (.12)  (.09)   (.12) (.09)   (.09) (.07) 
Benchmark      4.20*  6.38**   10.62**7.03** 5.66*  7.03**   2.23  8.17**   
      (2.54)  (2.12)   (3.23)  (2.68)   (3.37) (2.68)   (2.33) (2.15) 
 
Technology 
%  Non-managers  use  computers   -.02  .05   -.02  .13**   .11*  .11*   .03  .14** 
    (.04)  (.04)   (.06)  (.046)    (.06) (.05)   (.04) (.04) 
average  investment  per  worker*   .16**  -.10   -.15*  .23**   .14*  .03   .14**  -.11* 
      (.05)  (.07)   (.07)  (.08)   (.07) (.09)   (.05) (.07) 
Do R&D          .55      -    10.57**   -    14.66**   -    5.17*      - 
      (2.99)    (3.8)    (3.97)    (2.75) 
 
Profitability 
average  operating  profit*    4.09  -2.57   -12.29  3.17   25.88*  11.04   2.32  18.09** 
      (7.62)  (6.94)   (9.70)  (8.74)   (10.12)  (9.23)   (7.00) (7.03) 
 
Skill Capacity 
Average  years  of  education    -2.60  3.46*   -1.47  1.06   -.35  6.19**   .38  3.72* 
      (2.15)  (1.74)   (2.73)  (2.19)   (2.86) (2.31)   (1.97) (1.76) 
Communication  skills     .64  5.70**   -1.08  5.97*   6.98*  10.26**  4.70*  4.39* 
      (2.74)  (2.08)   (3.49)  (2.62)   (3.64) (2.76)   (2.52) (2.10) 
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Other Characteristics 
Age            -.06      -    -.16*      -    -.01      -    -.10*      - 
      (.05)    (.06)    (.07)    (.05) 
Unionized      -7.77**-6.09** -4.19  3.23   -10.95*-7.75** -6.27**-9.32** 
      (2.70)  (2.27)   (3.44)  (2.86)   (3.59) (3.02)   (2.49) (2.30) 
Total  workers  (00’s)     .001  -.0035* -.000  .0006   .001  -.002   -.0002  -.0023 
      (.001)(.001)   (.001)  (.002)        (.002) (.002)   (.001) (.0014) 
%  production  workers     .28*  .70**   .30  .28   .41*  .56**   .11  .37** 
      (.14)  (.13)   (.17)  (.16)   (.18) (.17)   (.13) (.13) 
%  managers      -.08  .43*   .56*  .48*   .31  .20   -.02  .34* 
      (.24)  (.19)   (.30)  (.24)   (.31) (.26)   (.22) (.20) 
%  supervisors      -.08  .61*   .65*  .53   -.14  .50   -.29  -.05 
      (.31)  (.30)   (.39)  (.35)   (.41) (.37)   (.28) (.28) 
%  technical  workers     .37*  .18   .57  .39   .52*  .45*   .08  .30 
      (.21)  (.20)   (.27)  (.25)   (.28) (.26)   (.20) (.20) 
 
Number  of  Establishments     589 926   589 926   589 926   589 926 
  
Adjusted  R-squared        .10 .11   .07 .07   .14 .07   .06 .10 
 
 
*Average investment per worker and average operating profit are for the period 1987-1992 for 1994 equations and for the period 
1990-1995 for the 1997 equations.  Also included in the estimation:  2-digit industry controls, % employees female, % employees 
minority, and the omitted occupational category is sales and clerical workers.  Standard errors in (), * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 1%, ~ almost significant at 10% 
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Table 5:  Extent of Organizational Innovation: Manufacturing* 
 
Dependent Variable:           Re-engineering  Count of Practices    Diffusion Count  Index of Practices   
Independent Variables:    1997      1994    1997    1994  1997    1994  1997       
External Focus 
Multi-establishment    .27*   .17  .26**   .29**  .22*   .17*  .08 
     (.12)   (.11)  (.09)       (.11)  (.09)   (.10)  (.09) 
%  of  product  exported    -.001   .008*  .0002   .007*  .0007   .006*  -.0001 
     (.003)   (.003)  (.002)   (.003)  (.002)   (.003)  (.002) 
Benchmark     .40**   .27**  .40**   .35**  .28**   .29**  .29** 
     (.09)   (.09)  (.07)       (.09)  (.07)   (.09)  (.07) 
 
Technology  
% Non-managers use computers  .004*    .002  .007**   .002  .005**   .001  .005** 
   (.002)   (.002)  (.001)       (.002)  (.001)   (.001)  (.001) 
average investment per worker*   .001     .002  -.003    .004*  -.001    .005** -.0002 
     (.003)   (.002)  (.002)   (.002)  (.002)   (.002)  (.002) 
 
Profitability 
average operating profit per worker*  .53*     .49*  .04    .47*  .42*    .44*  .36* 
     (.30)   (.28)  (.24)   (.28)  (.24)   (.26)  (.22) 
 
Skill Capacity 
Average  years  of  education   .03   .006  .26**   -.05  .22**   -.01  .18** 
     (.07)   (.08)  (.06)   (.08)  (.06)   (.07)  (.06) 
Communication  skills    .19*   .15  .31**   .19*  .23**   .20*  .32** 
     (.09)   (.10)  (.07)       (.10)  (.07)   (.09)  (.06) 
 
Other Establishment Characteristics 
Unionized     .006   -.07  -.14*   -.28**  -.30**   -.32**  -.26** 
     (.10)     (.09)  (.08)     (.09)    (.08)    (.09)   (.07)   45
Total  workers       .001   .0002**.0001* .0001  -.00004 .00004  -.00006 
     (.001)   (.00005)(.00005)  (.00004)(.00005)  (.00004)(.00004) 
% production workers     .28*    .015** .017**   .016** .02**    .014** .02** 
     (.14)   (.005)  (.004)       (.005)  (.004)   (.005)  (.004) 
%  managers     -.08   .006  .005   .01  .01*   .007  .015* 
     (.24)   (.009)  (.007)   (.008)  (.0067)   (.008)  (.006) 
%  supervisors     -.08   .006  .019*   -.003  .01   -.005  .016* 
     (.31)   (.01)  (.01)   (.011)  (.01)   (.01)  (.009) 
%  technical  workers    .37*   .03**  .014*   .023**  .015*   .029**  .01* 
     (.21)   (.008)  (.007)   (.008)  (.007)   (.007)  (.006) 
 
Number  of  Establishments   589   589 926   589 926   589 926 
  
Pseudo  R-squared     .10   .07 .07   .07 .06    
Adjusted  R-squared            .15  .16 
 
*Average investment per worker and average operating profit are for the period 1987-1992 for 1994 equations and for the period 
1990-1995 for the 1997 equations.  Also included in the estimation:  2-digit industry controls, % employees female, % employees 
minority, and the omitted occupational category is sales and clerical workers.  Standard errors in (), * significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 1%, ~ almost significant at 10%.  Count does not include re-engineering. 
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Table 6:  Organizational Innovation: Panel Results for Manufacturing 1994-1997* ( N=191) 
Dependent Variable:                 ΔCount          Reengineer        
Independent Variables               Eq. 1   Eq. 2________Eq. 3     Eq. 4_____                                    
External Focus 
ΔMulti-establishment       .21*     .43*    -.06  .67 
      (.12)        (.18)   (.26)  (.46) 
Δ% of product exported       -.004  -.003    .02*  .02* 
      (.004)  (.005)   (.007)  (.009) 
ΔBenchmark      .03  -.10   .16  .39* 
      (.12)  (.18)   (.15)  (.24) 
Technology 
Δ% Non-managers use computers    .001  .006*    .003  .002 
      (.002)  (.003)   (.003)  (.004) 
Δaverage investment per worker*    .003  .01    .03  .04* 
      (.01)  (.01)   (1.43)  (0.02) 
Profitability 
Δaverage  operating  profit*     1.02 1.21   -.08 -.17 
      (.99)  (1.08)   (1.28)  (1.56) 
Skill Capacity 
ΔAverage years of education     .05  -.008    -.24  -.13 
      (.11)  (.16)   (1.62)  (0.24) 
ΔCommunication  skills    .21*  .43*   .29*  .60* 
      (.12)  (.18)   (1.91)  (0.25) 
Other Characteristics 
ΔUnionized      .76  .03   -.01  .91 
      (.74)  (.80)   (0.01)  (1.17) 
ΔTotal  workers  (00’s)     .0005**.0008**  -.0003  -1.05e-06 
      (.0002)  (.0003)   (1.43)  .0004 
Δ%  production  workers    -.0004  -.009   -.013  -.02 
      (.009)  (.01)   (1.21)  (0.01) 
Δ%  managers      .01  .004   .004  -.001 
      (.01)  (.02)   (0.27)  (.03) 
Δ%  supervisors     .005  -.05*   -.02  -.07 
      (.02)  (.02)   (0.97)  (.04) 
Δ%  technical  workers     .005  -.002   -.017  -.01 
      (.01)  (.01)   (1.17)  (0.02) 
1994 Values 
Multi-establishment          -  -.69*       -  .92* 
       (.29)    (0.41) 
Share of product exported         -  -.015*      -  -.009 
       (.007)    (0.01) 
Benchmark            -   -.23       -  .32 
       (.24)    (.32) 
% Non-managers use computers      -  .007*       -  .001 
       (.004)    (0.005)   47
average investment per worker          -  -.003       -  -.003 
       (.01)    (0.02) 
Do R&D            -  -.29       -  -.33 
       (.20)    (0.29) 
average operating profit        -      -1.79*      -  1.14 
       (.56)    (0.85) 
Average years of education        -  -.15       -  .51* 
       (.20)    (0.30) 
Communication skills         -  .61**       -  .46 
       (0.25)    (0.34) 
Age        .005         -  -.006 
       (.004)    (.005) 
Unionized          -  -.24         -  -.27 
       (0.19)    (0.28) 
Total workers (00’s)          -  .0001       -  .00006 
       (0.0001)   (.0002) 
% production workers         -  -.01       -  .009 
       (0.01)    (0.02) 
% managers            -  -.03       -  .004 
       (0.02)    (0.04) 
% supervisors           -  -0.5*       -  -.06 
       (0.03)    (0.04) 
% technical workers          -  .005       -  0.04 
       (0.02)    (0.03) 
 
Pseudo R-squared        .08  .10    .11        .27  48
 
Table 7:  Probability of Having a Specific Innovation: Non-Manufacturing*  
Dependent Variable:             Means       Shared rewards        Rotate                 Train               Workers Meet            Self-managed 
Independent Variables       1994  1997    1994    1997          1994   1997       1994   1997        1994    1997          1994       1997   
External Focus 
Multi-establishment                    .70      .59       .71**   .57**        .02      .08          .09       .17           .02        .15             .02         -.002 
                                    (.15)    (.11)         (11)    (.11)        (.13)    (.17)         (.14)     (.15)           (.12)      (.11) 
Benchmark            .35      .36       .25*     .04            .24*    .10          .31       .27           .43**    .33*           .37         .40 
                                     (.12)    (.11)         (.11)    (.11)       (.14)    (.18)         (.16)     (.16)           (.11)      (.11) 
 
Technology 
% Non-managers use computers   .53   .68         .002    .0018        .001     .0018  .006** .003~       .0002    .0002          -.0002   -.0005
                                              (.002)  (.0015)     (.001)  (.0015)   (.0018) (.002)      (.002)   (.002)         (.002)    (.002) 
Do R&D            .34        -         .74**      -            .15          -          .17          -           .49            -             .30**         - 
                                       (.12)                  (.11)                  (.15)                    (.16)                        (.12) 
 
Skill Capacity 
Average years of education        13.12  13.18    .04      .16**        .03      -.01         .06       .10           .05         .17*          .01         .22** 
                                     (.06)    (.05)         (.05)    (.05)       (.06)    (.08)         (.07)       (.08)         (.05)      (.05) 
Communication skills          .83     .82        .20      .21           -.10     .24*         .07       -.21         .22         .10            .05         .15 
                                     (.18)    (.15)         (.14)   (.14)        (.16)     (.21)        (.17)      (.19)         (.15)       (.15) 
 
Other Characteristics 
Unionized            .23      .19        .34*    -.05          -.04     -.04         -.18      .18           .02        -.08           .01         -.08 
                                     (.15)    (.14)         (.13)   (.14)        (.15)     (.21)        (.17)      (.19)         (.14)      (.14) 
Age of establishment  (years)        23        -         -.004       -            -.001       -         -.001        -          -.0001       -             -.003          - 
                            (.003)                   (.002)                (.003)                  (.003)                      (.003) 
Total workers (00’s)         497     415      .00008*.00006    6.66e-06 .0001*    2e-05        .00002     -1.9e-06  .00003      6.7e-06    5e-05 
                                    (5e-05)  (5e-05)      (3e-05)   ( 5e-05)    (5e-05)  (.0002)      (5e-05)    (.0001)     (.00003) (5e-05) 
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% production workers        54       51         .0005    .006       -.004     .002        -.008   -.001       -.002     .003          .004       .01** 
                                    (.0043) (.004)     (.004)   (.004)      (.005)  (.006)      (.004)    (.005)       (.004)    (.004) 
% managers           12       14       -.0008   .001       .001      -.007       .002     -.02*       (5e-05)    .007          .006       .004 
                                     (.0072) (.006)    (.006)   (.006)      (.009)  (.009)       (.008)    (.009)       (.007)    (.007) 
% supervisors            9         8      -.0022    -.005      .015    .013          .007     -.007       .012      .05**        .015*     .009 
                                     (.0099) (.009)     (.009)  (.009)       (.01)    (.013)      (.01)      (.01)         (.009)    (.009) 
% technical workers         11        12        .0058    .006        .008     .01*        -.009    -.008       -.0004   .006          .008       .017** 
                                    (.0049    (.005)     (.005)  (.004)  (.006)   (.008)      (.006)    (.007)      (.005)     (.005) 
 
Number of Establishments      696     689        696       689        696      689     696      689          696      689          696         689 
Pseudo R-squared                                 0.22     0.12         .05        .06            .14       .15           .11       .12           .07          .08 
 
*Also included:  2-digit industry controls, % employees female, % employees minority, and the omitted occupational category is sales 
and clerical workers.  Standard errors in (), * significant at 10%, ** significant at 1%, ~ almost significant at 10%.   
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Table 8:  Diffusion of Specific Innovations: Non-Manufacturing*  
Dependent Variable:                   % rotate        % training   % meeting     % self-managed
Independent Variables       1994  1997      1994    1997           1994  1997      1994    1997    
External Focus 
Multi-establishment         -.23    -1.27      1.59     3.76           3.48  -2.40     -1.61    -6.56** 
             (2.06)  (2.35)     (3.38)  (3.04)        (3.64)  (3.30)     (2.02)   (2.49) 
Benchmark           .03    -1.07      2.58     1.57           6.35*  1.74      1.46     3.57 
            (1.96)  (2.34)      (3.12)  (3.04)         (3.47)  (3.29)     (1.92)   (2.48) 
 
Technology 
% Non-managers use computers    .04    .02       .06       .04             .09*      .05      .001     .016 
                                (0.03)  (.03)       (.04)    (.04)          (.05)      (.05)     (.027)   (.035) 
Do R&D           1.16       -       6.85*     -            7.69*     -     4.35*      - 
                                                              (2.05)                 (3.26)                    (3.62)                   (2.01) 
 
Skill Capacity 
Average years of education       .55    -1.72      -1.98   1.48           3.38*    -1.34     .51      3.83** 
           (.92)     (1.14)     (1.47)  (1.48)        (1.63)    (1.60)    (.91)     (3.24) 
Communication skills        .53    1.42      .66      1.44          -.43        5.68    6.08*     3.07 
           (2.57)   (3.06)     (4.10)  (3.96)        (4.55)    (4.29)   (2.53)    (3.24) 
 
Other Characteristics 
Unionized        -1.53    .31      -5.21    6.79*        -9.40*    -7.93*   -.79      1.00 
           (2.34)   (2.94)     (3.73)  (3.81)        (4.15)    (4.13)   (2.30)    (3.12) 
Age            -.10*      -       .006       -            -.13*     -      -.09*      - 
           (.04)         (.07)            (.077)       (.04) 
Total workers (00’s)      -.001   -.002      -.002* -.003*       -.0019*   -.05  -.0006   -.0008 
          (.001)   (.001)      (.001)  (.001)        (.001)  (.16)  (.0006)   (.001) 
   51
% production workers       .07   .08      -.25*    .16           -.22*  .29*  .09    .25** 
           (.07)   (.08)      (.11)    (.11)          (.12)  (.17)  (.06)   (.09) 
% managers        .03   -.09      .12*     .006          -.25  .53**  .19*    .10 
           (.12)   (.13)     (.08)    (.17)          (.20)  (.186)  (.11)   (.14) 
% supervisors       .30*     .20     -.13      .12           .05  .58*  .02   .21 
           (.15)     (.19)    (.24)    (.25)         (.26)  (.27)  (.14)   (.20) 
% technical workers         .09     .01     .13     -.02          -.35*  .20  .12   .15 
          (.09)     (.10)    (.14)    (.13)         (.15)  (.14)  (.08)   (.11) 
 
Number of Establishments       696     689     696      689           696  689  696   689 
Adjusted R-squared        .04     .02     .14      .07           .07  .04  .05   .06 
 
*Also included:  2-digit industry controls, % employees female, % employees minority, and the omitted occupational category is sales 
and clerical workers.  Standard errors in (), * significant at 10%, ** significant at 1%, ~ almost significant at 10%.     52
 
Table 9:  Extent of Organizational Innovation: Non-Manufacturing*  
Dependent Variable:               Re-engineering Count of Practices    Diffusion of Practices  Index of Practices   
Independent Variables        1997    1994    1997    1994  1997    1994  1997       
External Focus 
Multi-establishment           .22*              .29**   .28**   .32**  .14    .19**  .007 
              (.11)     (.09)    (.09)    (.09)  (.09)    (.07)  (.07) 
Benchmark             .55**    .47**   .28**   .21*  .04    .19*** .07 
              (.11)     (.09)    (.09)    (.09)  (.09)    (.07)  (.07) 
 
Technology 
% Non-managers use computers       .001    .32**   .12    .34**  .16    .27**  .16 
              (.002)            (.12)  (.12)             (.13)  (.12)    (.10)  (.03) 
 
Skills Capacity 
Average years of education         .14**    .06    .17**   .063  .09*    .05  .05 
              (.05)     (.04)    (.04)    (.04)  (.04)    (.03)  (.04) 
Communication skills          .08      .15    .175    .09  .27*    .17  .16 
              (.15)     (.12)    (.11)    (.12)  (.11)    (.09)  (.10) 
 
Other Characteristics 
Unionized             .03      .036    -.04    -.08  .002    -.12  -.009 
              (.14)     (.10)    (.11)    (.11)  (.11)    (.08)  (.09) 
Total workers             .0001    .00003  -.00005  -.00004 -.00004  -.00005*-.000055 
              (.0001)    (.00003) (.00004)  (.00003)(.00004)  (.00002) (.000035) 
% production workers          .002    .0002   .0111**  -.00001.0115**  -.00005 .0097** 
              (.004)    (.0030)  (.0031)  (.0030) (.0031)   (.0023) (.0026) 
% managers             .002    .0045   .0044   .0083  .0044    .0064  .0061 
              (.006)    (.0053)  (.0050)  (.0053) (.0050)   (.0041) (.0042) 
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% supervisors            -.001    .0128*   .0087  .0047  .0087    .0033  .0113* 
               (.009)    (.0067)  (.0073)  (.0068) (.0073)   (.0053) (.0061) 
% technical workers            .007    .0039   .0058   .0035  .0058    .0026  .0049 
               (.005)    (.0039)  (.0039)  (.0040) (.0039)   (.0031) (.0032) 
 
Number of Establishments          696            696  689    696  689    696  689 
   
Pseudo R-squared            .11   0.05  0.05    0.05  0.04     
Adjusted  R-squared            0.12  0.07 
 
*Also included:  2-digit industry controls, % employees female, % employees minority, and the omitted occupational category is sales 
and clerical workers.  Standard errors in (), * significant at 10%, ** significant at 1%, ~ almost significant at 10%.  Count does not 
include re-engineering. 
 
 